Doctor at centre of Baha Mousa’s death faces a six-week ‘fitness to practice’ hearing

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Badly beaten face of Baha Mousa after his death at the hands of British troops on 15 September 2003
Badly beaten face of Baha Mousa after his death at the hands of British troops on 15 September 2003

DR DEREK Keilloh is to face a six-weeks General Medical Council fitness to practice panel, commencing 11 June 2012, over his role in the death of Baha Mousa.

Baha Mousa’s death, at the hands of British forces on 15 September 2003, was the subject of a public inquiry under the chairmanship of Sir William Gage, which published its report in September 2011.

Baha Mousa died after three days of vicious abuse at Battle Group Main which was one of the bases of 1st Queen’s Lancashire Regiment (1QLR).

Gage’s report records that Baha Mousa sustained 93 different external injuries including ‘multiple bruises and grazes situated on the head, neck and torso and the upper and lower limbs.’

Dr Keilloh was the Regimental Medical Officer at Battle Group Main and was responsible for the welfare of Baha Mousa and the other Iraqi civilians detained with him.

Evidence heard by the Baha Mousa Inquiry report gives rise to serious concerns about Keilloh’s conduct.

In particular, after attempting to resuscitate Baha Mousa, Keilloh said that he had not noticed the extensive injuries evident on Baha Mousa’s body and had only noticed a small trace of dried blood under the nostril.

Other (more junior) medics gave evidence that they drew Keilloh’s attention to injuries evident on Baha Mousa’s body, and themselves noticed significant injuries.

The position of the victims in the Inquiry was that Keilloh must have known by that point that Baha Mousa had been the victim of a series of assaults.

Dr Keilloh was aware that the detainees, including Baha Mousa, were being hooded and they were kept in a building with no facilities and in considerable heat.

After Baha Mousa’s death, two of the other detainees were brought to the Regimental Aid Post and examined by Keilloh.

Both complained of having been assaulted by soldiers. Each had sustained injuries and one was suffering with a large inguinal hernia which had been noticed by some of the guards.

It is difficult to understand how Dr Keilloh could have failed to observe that these detainees had been assaulted and, if he did so fail, this was a serious failure.

Keilloh administered pain relief medication and returned both men to the detention facility.

He did not report what he knew to anyone in the chain of command.

Keilloh told a fellow 1QLR officer the following morning that one of the detainees had died and the others were in a ‘shit state’.

Although he was the treating doctor at the time of death, Keilloh never signed a death certificate. He told another doctor, who did sign the death certificate, that the death had occurred from ‘cardiorespiratory arrest after being taken into custody’.

Public Interest Lawyers act for Baha Mousa’s father, Colonel Daoud Mousa.

Phil Shiner, Solicitor of Public Interest Lawyers, said: ‘I was shocked when I heard this doctor’s evidence. He had no regard at all for Baha Mousa’s wellbeing.

‘If the GMC conclude that he is fit to practice, in the light of this most compelling of evidence against him, I will eat my copy of the three volumes of Sir William Gage’s report’

At a press conference on Thursday September 8th, 2011, on the then just-published report by Sir William Gage on the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, lawyers issued a statement on behalf of the victims of British Army torture in Iraq.

Phil Shiner said: ‘The Inquiry has found that innocent men, not involved in insurgent activity, were the victims of “violent and cowardly abuse” by soldiers of this country’s army.

‘One of the innocent men was Baha Mousa – a 26 years-old recently bereaved father of two sons and guardian to two others.

‘Sir William Gage’s report provides us all with a chronicle of what he himself describes as “grave and shameful events”.

‘At the heart of this is the death of Baha Mousa. Sir William makes it clear that this cannot be explained away as being simply the act of a few rogue soldiers.

‘His report provides a detailed analysis of how hooding, stress position, sleep deprivation, noise disorientation and minimal food and water ultimately contributed to Baha dying in British custody.

‘These techniques were explicitly banned by Edward Heath in 1972 and were found to be unlawful, but were being used on a systemic basis by the 1st Battalion, Queen’s Lancashire Regiment in Iraq in 2003 to force suspects to provide information.

‘It is important to record that what we know now has not automatically come about because our political and military leaders were committed to pursuing truth and justice from the outset.

‘The prize of this Inquiry – which will contribute to the betterment of our armed services as much as it gives some justice to our clients – was only the result of legal action that was vigorously resisted by the MoD at every stage.

‘In all those battles Daoud Mousa, Baha’s father, was an inspirational figure. Sir William describes him as “the driving force” that made the Inquiry possible.’

Sapna Malik of Leigh Day & Co said: ‘Sir William has found that the core techniques that Phil Shiner has just described, some of which you see on the DVD we just looked at, were known about by the chain of command in 1st Queens Lancashire Regiment. Soldiers from the commanding officer down knew that techniques of this nature were being used.

‘This was done without writing anything down or properly supervising what was going on.

‘Sir William has found that no amount of explanation based on lack of planning, lack of resources and the hostile nature of the environment can excuse this group of officers allowing inhumane practices into their midst.

‘As to the more serious assaults, Sir William has found that they “were not perpetrated by just one or two rogue individuals”, but names 19 individual soldiers, including three senior non commissioned officers.

‘Those 19 names have to be seen as part of a much wider group of soldiers, who Sir William found must have been aware that violence was afoot, but did nothing to stop it.

‘Of those who could have stopped what was going on but did not, I will highlight just three of the many names:

‘l Major Michael Peebles, still a serving officer, was the officer in charge of the internment of prisoners in this Battle Group. He kept these prisoners on the Camp far beyond the 14 hour limit laid down in the standing orders.

‘He knew they were being subjected to conditioning techniques and physical assaults well before Baha’s death, but did nothing to stop this. He repeatedly downplayed to the Court Martial and this inquiry his knowledge about what was going on in the detention building.

‘l Lieutenant Craig Rodgers, now retired from the army but never the subject of criminal charges, was the platoon commander, whose multiple carried out some of the most violent assaults on the detainees, in what Sir William has described as “a free-for-all”.

‘The Inquiry found that Rodgers must have known of the violence that his multiple were perpetrating on these prisoners. He lied to the Inquiry in denying such knowledge.

‘Sir William has concluded that Rodgers bears “a significant responsibility” for this “disgraceful breach of discipline”. He also found that had Rodgers taken action when he first knew what was going on Baha would almost certainly not have died.

‘l Finally, Colonel Jorge Mendonca was the commanding officer of the Battle Group. He had the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that detainees were treated humanely.

‘He knew that conditioning techniques were being used. And yet he allowed his soldiers to implement them although they had no training, no written guidance and no proper supervision.

‘The report underscores the very significant failure on his part in this regard. Sir William has also found that Mendonca fostered in his regiment a so-called “robust” approach to dealing with Iraqis which he should have realised could spill over into violent prisoner handling.

‘In fact, it led to what the Inquiry describes as a “severe breakdown in military discipline”. Even after the death of Baha Mousa, Mendonca maintains that he did not go into the detention building to look at the prisoners himself.

‘By this final act of omission Mendonca therefore condemned the detainees to an additional 12 hours of suffering and further abuse.

‘My final observation is that the acquittal of the soldiers by the Court Martial – that is Mendonca, Peebles, Davies, Stacey, Fallon and Crowcroft is an injustice, as is the acquittal of Donald Payne of the manslaughter charge.

‘Moreover, the fact that other soldiers, such as Rodgers, were neither charged with offences nor otherwise disciplined remains an injustice.

‘In the light of the cogent and serious findings by Sir William Gage we now expect that the military and civilian prosecuting authorities of this country will act to ensure that justice is done.’