THE Leveson report’s executive summary considered whether ‘the close relationship’ with politicians affected press standards.
It says: ‘I can do no more here than paint the general picture and identify the recommendations that I have made.
‘Module Three was not in the main concerned with the routine interactions between politicians and the press; broadly, that relationship does not operate so as to give rise to any legitimate public concern.
‘On the contrary, the overwhelming evidence is that relations between politicians and the press on a day to day basis are in robust good health and performing the vital public interest functions of a free press in a vigorous democracy, providing an open forum for public debate, enabling a free flow of information and challenge, and holding power to account.
‘In these circumstances, close relationships, including personal friendships, are very much part and parcel of all of this and not in themselves any cause for surprise or concern.
‘This part of the Report has focused on a very different aspect of the closeness of the relationship between press and politicians.
‘That is, the question of whether it may have, or may appear to have, impacted on the willingness or ability of politicians to decide matters of public policy about the media, and specifically of policy about press standards, fairly and impartially in the public interest. . .
‘The evidence has ranged through the most recent five UK Premierships, considering each administration’s press relationships at the highest level and, whether, from the sequence of key events, any patterns could be said to emerge.
‘First, the Inquiry considered in particular the acquisition of The Times by Rupert Murdoch in the time of Prime Minister Thatcher.
‘Second, it reflected on the response of Prime Minister Major’s Government to the reports provided by Sir David Calcutt QC (and what Stephen Dorrell, then Secretary of State for National Heritage, described as the “do nothing” option on press standards).
‘Third, it looked at the lessons to be drawn from the approach to news management of Prime Minister Blair, and at the media policies of his Government, including the specific legislative proposals relating to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Communications Act 2003.
‘Fourth, it considered Prime Minister Brown’s approach to the DPA (in particular, the amendment of the DPA [Data Protection Act – News Line] in 2008 following the reports of the Information Commissioner). . .
‘Fifth, the Inquiry considered a range of aspects of the relationship between contemporary politics and the press, about which public concern has been strongly expressed, including a particularly detailed consideration of the bid by News Corp to increase its holding in BSkyB, as explained more fully below.
‘Taken as a whole, the evidence clearly demonstrates that, over the last 30-35 years and probably much longer, the political parties of UK national Government and of UK official Opposition, have had or developed too close a relationship with the press in a way which has not been in the public interest. . . .
‘In part, it has been a matter of going too far in trying to control the supply of news and information to the public in return for the hope of favourable treatment by sections of the press, to a degree and by means beyond what might be considered to be the fair and reasonable (albeit partisan) conduct of public debate. . . .
‘There are other respects, however, in which the evidence suggests that politicians have conducted themselves in relation to the press in ways which have not served the public interest.
‘They have placed themselves in positions in which they risked becoming vulnerable to influences which are neither known about nor transparent.
‘There is thus no mechanism for holding them to account (which is, of course, the usual responsibility of the press itself). . . .
‘I have concluded that a combination of these factors has contributed to a lessening of public confidence in the conduct of public affairs, by giving rise to legitimate perceptions and concerns that politicians and the press have traded power and influence in ways which are contrary to the public interest and out of public sight. . .
‘One of those recent examples was the handling by two successive Secretaries of State and their departments of the bid by News Corp to increase its holding in BSkyB.
‘This bid was launched in June 2010, one month after the General Election. In his capacity as Secretary of State for BIS, the Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP took responsibility for handling the bid under European and domestic law.
‘Despite strong attempts to lobby him behind the scenes, Dr Cable acted with scrupulous care and impartiality until he was interviewed by two journalists posing as his constituents in early December 2010.
‘He was fully entitled to hold strong views about the press in general and News International in particular, but his quasi-judicial role in relation to the bid meant that he had to put them to one side.
‘Unfortunately, his unguarded remarks to these journalists about Rupert Murdoch and News International entered the public domain, thus creating an appearance of bias, and the Prime Minister was forced to transfer responsibility for the handling of the bid elsewhere.
‘The Rt Hon Jeremy Hunt MP also had strong views as to the merits of the bid. He too was entitled to have these, if for no other reason that media policy fell within his DCMS (Department for Culture Media and Sport) portfolio.
‘The transfer to Mr Hunt was a decision the Prime Minister was fully entitled to make. In these circumstances the bid came to DCMS and its Secretary of State in a crisis not of their making. . . .
‘In every respect bar one, the bid was commendably handled. Unfortunately, there was a serious hidden problem which, had the bid ultimately gone through and that problem come out, would have had the potential to jeopardise it altogether. Mr Hunt’s Special Adviser, Adam Smith, was the known point of contact between DCMS and News Corp’s professional lobbyist, Frederic Michel.
‘Mr Smith already knew Mr Michel, and, when faced with the intimacy, charm, volume and persistence of Mr Michel’s approaches, he was put in an extremely difficult position.
‘The processes that were put in place to manage the bid did not prove to be robust enough in this particular respect. Best practice of the kind subsequently encapsulated in the Cabinet Office guidance on quasi-judicial decision-making was not followed.
‘I have concluded that the seeds of this problem were sown at an early stage, and that the risks were, or should have been, obvious from the outset. I doubt the wisdom of appointing Mr Smith to this role.
‘The consequential risks were then compounded by the cumulative effects of the lack of explicit clarity in Mr Smith’s role, the lack of express instruction that it was clear that he fully understood, and a lack of supervision by Mr Hunt.
‘I have concluded that there is no credible evidence of actual bias on the part of Mr Hunt.
‘However, the voluminous exchanges between Mr Michel and Mr Smith, in the circumstances, give rise to a perception of bias. The fact that they were conducted informally, and off the departmental record, are an additional cause for concern.
‘The history of decision-taking on matters of media policy, including the history of the BSkyB bid, illustrates a significant issue which seems to me to lie at the heart of the problematic dimension to the relationship between the press and the politicians. . .
‘That lobbying has been conducted in part overtly and editorially, and in part covertly and through the medium of personal relationships with politicians.
‘I should say that I do not consider the self-interested lobbying of the press to be an appropriate matter for press regulation. . . .
‘On the other hand, I consider it to be entirely the responsibility of politicians who are the object of press lobbying to judge how far and in what way they consider it to be in the public interest for them to respond. . .
‘The relationships within which lobbying can take place are not the everyday relationships of journalism and politics.
‘They are the relationships of policy makers (actual or potential) and those who stand to benefit directly from those policies. . .
‘In these relationships the boundaries between the conduct of Government business with its formalities and accountabilities on the one hand, and informal “political” or “personal” interactions on the other, are not clear, and inevitably so. . . .
‘I have also recommended that the most senior Front Bench politicians, whether in Government or Opposition, should give very serious consideration to accepting the case for public transparency at least to some degree beyond the strict requirements of current law and practice.
‘I have only very limited steps in mind. They relate to the publication of the fact of meetings between very senior politicians and the executive decision-makers of the press (but, importantly, whether conducted in person or through agents) and some indication of when matters of media policy are discussed.
‘This would apply to all such meetings, whether Governmental, or capable of being designated “political” or “personal”, because of the degree to which those classifications do not appear to hold good.
‘I also recommend periodic disclosure, by way of general estimate only, of some basic information about the frequency or density of other communications (such as correspondence, phone, text and email).
‘A little more transparency by way of these very simple, plain facts about the kinds of relationships within which powerful press lobbying takes place are designed to suggest directions for improvement in public understanding and confidence in the political process. . . .’
