The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee of MPs has said the UK government’s ‘decision not to speak to Hamas in 2007 following the Mecca agreement has been counter-productive’.
It urged the Brown government and former prime minster Blair in his role as Middle East Quartet (EU, Russia, UN and US) envoy to engage with Hamas MPs.
In their Eighth Report – Global Security: The Middle East, the MPs say on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories:
‘2. We conclude that the Temporary International Mechanism has played a limited, but important, role in mitigating the economic and humanitarian crises in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This crisis has been severe and its impact on the political and security situation, in particular in the Gaza Strip, should not be under-estimated. (Paragraph 23)
3. We conclude that the decision not to speak to Hamas in 2007 following the Mecca agreement has been counter-productive. We further conclude that a national unity Government could and should have been established much earlier than the spring of 2007.
‘We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government set out when it began to actively support the establishment of a national unity Government in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. (Paragraph 36).
‘4. We conclude that the unwillingness of the EU to modify the financial boycott of the Palestinian Authority following the Mecca agreement was very damaging.
‘The international community failed to prepare and implement rapid economic solutions to reward those elements within the national unity Government that respected the three Quartet principles.
‘We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government provide an assessment of whether it believes in hindsight that the EU and the rest of the international community acted with sufficient urgency to create conditions in which direct aid could be restored as soon as possible.
‘We also recommend that the Government in its response to this Report should clarify the extent to which difficulties in restoring aid to the national unity Government in 2007 were due to the impact on the institutions of the Palestinian Authority of the suspension of aid in 2006. (Paragraph 41).
‘5. We conclude that the actions of both Hamas and Fatah militia forces in the Gaza Strip were deplorable and should be condemned by all. However, the escalation of violence in June 2007 should not have come as a surprise to the UK Government or any of its international partners.
‘We conclude that the decision to boycott Hamas despite the Mecca agreement and the continued suspension of aid to the national unity Government meant that this Government was highly likely to collapse.
‘We further conclude that whilst the international community was not the root cause of the intra-Palestinian violence, it failed to take the necessary steps to reduce the risk of such violence occurring. (Paragraph 50).
‘6. We conclude that the Government was right to make contact with Hamas in its efforts to secure the release of Alan Johnston. We welcome the role of Hamas in his release. (Paragraph 59).
‘7. Given the failure of the boycott to deliver results, we recommend that the Government should urgently consider ways of engaging politically with moderate elements within Hamas as a way of encouraging it to meet the three Quartet principles.
‘We conclude that any attempts to pursue a “West Bank first” policy would risk further jeopardising the peace process.
‘We recommend that the Government urge President Abbas to come to a negotiated settlement with Hamas with a view to re-establishing a national unity Government across the Occupied Palestinian Territories. (Paragraph 60).
8. We conclude that the Temporary International Mechanism needs to be replaced by a more permanent solution that can meet the profound humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.
‘We recommend that the Government continue to press Israel to ensure full humanitarian access to Gaza.
‘We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government set out its interpretation of Israel’s obligations under international humanitarian law and the responsibilities of the international community to ensure humanitarian provision for Gaza. (Paragraph 64).
‘9. We welcome the appointment of the former Prime Minister as the Quartet Representative.
‘We recommend that he engage with Hamas in order to facilitate reconciliation amongst Palestinians.
‘We further recommend that his mandate be broadened to include explicitly working with Israel, the Palestinians and regional states to advance peace negotiations. (Paragraph 67).
‘10. We conclude that the Roadmap for Peace has largely become an irrelevance in the dynamic of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
‘The unwillingness of the Quartet to challenge robustly the failure by both sides to meet their obligations has undermined its usefulness as a vehicle for peace.
‘However, we recommend that whilst the process of the Roadmap has failed, its objectives – an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state peacefully co-existing with a secure Israel and an end to the occupation that began in 1967 – must remain the basis for a solution to this conflict. (Paragraph 73).
‘11. We conclude that the Arab Initiative for Peace is a positive proposal that deserves serious consideration by all parties.
‘We recommend that the Government continue to support the Initiative, and that it facilitate where possible discussion between the parties on contentious issues such as the right of return for Palestinian refugees. (Paragraph 79)
‘12. We conclude that the Government’s focus on developing an economic roadmap for peace in the Middle East is to be strongly welcomed.
‘However, we further conclude that the expansion of Israeli roadblocks and the growth of illegal settlements in the West Bank are among the factors that have had a very damaging impact on the economic situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
‘We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government provide the Committee with an update on what progress has been made on implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access.
‘We recommend that the Government also provide its objective assessment of whether the removal of checkpoints and roadblocks would present a credible threat to the security of the State of Israel. (Paragraph 83).’
In a section on Lebanon, the Committee says: ‘19. We conclude that Hezbollah is undeniably an important element in Lebanon’s politics, although its influence, along with Iran’s and Syria’s, continues to be a malign one.
‘We further conclude that, as the movement will realistically only be disarmed through a political process, the Government should encourage Hezbollah to play a part in Lebanon’s mainstream politics.
‘We recommend that the Government should engage directly with moderate Hezbollah Parliamentarians.
‘The Government should continue to refuse to engage with the military wing of Hezbollah. (Paragraph 120).’
On Syria, the report said: ‘20. We conclude that Syria plays a significant role in most of the key areas in the Middle East and that this role may slowly be changing for the better.
‘The support of Syria will be of great assistance to efforts to promote stability in the Middle East, in Lebanon and in Iraq in particular.
‘This cannot be ignored when the Government and the international community engage in diplomacy with the Syrian authorities. (Paragraph 139).
‘21. We conclude that the Government’s decision to send Sir Nigel Sheinwald to Damascus in October 2006 was the correct one. In our view, the EU ban on ministerial contact with Syria is not helpful in the context of engaging constructively with the Syrian Government.
‘We recommend that the Government resume such contacts without delay. We further recommend that the Government continue to support the work of Javier Solana as part of the EU’s engagement with Syria. (Paragraph 144).
‘22. There is no excuse for Syria not to co-operate fully with the international tribunal over the death of Rafik Hariri and in no circumstances should this be negotiated away.
‘However, we conclude that more can be done to reassure Syria that efforts to build a workable democratic state in Lebanon are not aimed at destabilising the regime in Damascus. (Paragraph 148)
‘23. We conclude that the European Union Association Agreement with Syria presents a powerful incentive for President Assad to remedy his country’s political behaviour, particularly given Syria’s current efforts towards economic reform.
‘We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government set out the list of conditions that Syria would have to fulfil if the European Union is to ratify the Agreement. (Paragraph 149).
‘24. We conclude that a peace settlement between Israel and Syria would help to transform the political dynamics of the region.
‘We recommend that the Government place much greater emphasis than at present on finding a settlement that will end Syrian support for Palestinian Islamist groups and the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. (Paragraph 150).’